Abstract. The study examines general axiomatics of Balinski and Young and analyzes existed proportional representation methods using this approach. The second part of the paper provides new axiomatics based on rational choice models. New system of axioms is applied to study known proportional representation systems. It is shown that there is no proportional representation method satisfying a minimal set of the axioms (monotonicity and neutrality).
INTRODUCTION
The most extensive studies of proportional representation systems were held in the United States. This is due to two-hundred years history of using different methods of seats distribution in the House of Representatives.
Despite the fact that Balinski and Young [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] examined the population size, we rewrite the properties in terms of number of votes and extend their formulation.
Formulation Of Proportional Representation Problem In Terms Of Rational Choice
The parliament is elected by party lists system. Every voter from set N ( n N ) is characterized by preferences represented by linear order P on a set of parties A (
k A
). Procedure should determine the representation of each party completing S seats in parliament
The final choice is a set of S alternatives. We assume that
The set of voters, who prefers alternative x to alternative y denoted as
The procedure of proportional representation is characterized by the choice function If the number of votes the party i has increased, while in the other parties remained unchanged, the representation of the party should not be reduced. 9. Quota property. Number of seats should deviate from the quota by not more than one seat. 10. Consistency.
Representation of parties with the same set of votes should not differ by more than one seat. 
, procedure satisfies monotonicity, neutrality, then Consider the profile ' P G in which the alternatives x, y stand in the place of alternatives t, z, respectively, then 
